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- EU enlargement to CEE will shift the Union's external frontier to the east, but 
where it will finally come to settle remains undecided. Yet the location of the 
external frontier has profound implications both for the EU's internal 
development and for its external relations.
- Preoccupation the internal consequences of enlargement for the EU and 
existing member-states must not be allowed to displace attention to the EU's 
wider responsibilities and foreign policy objectives. A broader concept of border 
management is needed, involving active engagement over a wide range of fields 
with the eastern neighbours. Effective border management depends on their co­
operation.
- The issues of migration and crime have to be treated quite separately, as the 
Amsterdam Treaty recognised.
- The shortcomings and institutional complexity of JHA co-operation, the 
obscurity of the JHA acquis, and the diversity of practices within the Union are a 
source of damaging contradictions which give rise to confusion, and potentially 
cynicism, in the CEE accession countries.
- Police co-operation depends on building mutual trust. Cultural stereotypes can 
be dispelled by closer contacts, especially through training programmes. EU 
member-states could co-operate in the provision of a joint training programme
for CEE.
- The new eastern border is the most demanding to police, and the burden cannot 
be left to the new CEE member-states alone. New forms of joint and multilateral 























































































































































































Borders are inseparable from the entities they enclose. The forthcoming 
enlargement of the EU entails a shift in the Union’s external frontier to the east, 
but precisely where the external border will finally be is a matter of continuing 
uncertainty. Yet the location of the external frontier has profound implications 
both for the future internal development of the Union and for its external 
relations.
The inclusion of new member-states from Central and Eastern Europe 
will considerably increase the political, economic and cultural diversity within 
the Union, raising questions about the feasibility of further political and 
economic integration. The existing EU institutional framework, already 
showing signs of strain, will require radical reforms in order to cope with the 
demands of many more, and more diverse, members. Alternative possibilities 
are a halt to further integration and the reversion of the Union to a loose 
association of states; or greater internal differentiation, leading to the formation 
of a "core’ of states proceeding rapidly towards full monetary and political 
union, and a heterogeneous periphery of states with more or less long-term 
transitional "catch-up" arrangements and some permanent "opt-outs" from key 
aspects of integration.
The inclusion of new member-states from Central and Eastern Europe 
will transform the nature of the borders, and thus the relations, between new and 
existing member-states. What had hitherto been a "hard", external EU border 
will become a "softer", internal one, and this has both positive and negative 
effects for both sides. On the one hand, greater ease of communications across 
the border promotes a revival of cross-border trade and commerce, tourism and 
cultural exchanges with beneficial effects especially marked in the border 
regions. On the other hand, continuing inequalities raise anxieties on the 
western side of the border about the relocation of industries and jobs to the 
lower wage economies of the new eastern member-states, and about the impact 
on western labour markets of the potential influx of workers seeking higher 
wages. In the future member-states of Central Europe, there are fears about 
economic domination, threats to traditional cultures and ways of life, and the 
potential emigration to the west of their brightest and best educated young 
people.
Enlargement will bring the EU's external border into direct contact with a 
range of politically and economically unstable states in Eastern Europe. While 
the underlying rationale of enlargement is to export stability and security, 
enlargement in stages threatens to create new dividing lines, and new tensions, 



























































































out. If the EU is to become the pivot of the future European security order, it 
will have to develop a common foreign and security policy. This requires the 
formulation of an agreed and detailed strategy for dealing with the new eastern 
neighbours, and the will to implement it. This presupposes the existence of 
common interests and an underlying sense of common identity within the EU, 
which are elusive even now and are likely to become more difficult to define 
with the inclusion of several new member-states, each of which has its own 
particular interests, perspectives and priorities in its relations with the states to 
the east.
Eastward enlargement is taking place at a time of heightened awareness 
about the changing nature and significance of borders not only within Europe 
but globally. The EU’s response to the competitive pressures of globalisation 
has been to deepen internal economic integration, completing the Single Market 
with the establishment of monetary union. The Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties have complemented this with the commitment to achieving political 
union and the creation of an "area of freedom, security and justice" within the 
borders of the EU. This has had radical implications for the nature of borders: 
the internal borders of the EU, between the member-states, have lost many of 
their traditional functions with the implementation of the "four freedoms" of 
movement of persons, capital, goods and services. But they retain nevertheless 
potent symbolic appeal as markers of national territories to which distinct 
national identities are attached. Language use, cultural practices and education 
systems are still largely "caged" within traditional nation-state borders. As a 
necessary concomitant to the increasing "softness" and permeability of EU 
internal borders, the external border with non-member-states is becoming 
increasingly "hard" as the place where the key traditional functions of national 
borders - customs control, regulation of immigration, and security - are 
exercised.
The definition of "security" itself has undergone change, as the boundary 
between external and internal security has become blurred. Threats to the 
security of member-states are perceived less as threats of a conventional 
military kind and more as criminal threats - mafias, drugs, terrorism, illegal 
immigrants, traffic in human beings, and environmental pollution. The external 
border of the EU does not have the traditional role of a military defensive line 
but one of excluding these undesirable "soft security" threats coming from 
outside the territory of the Union. Finding an effective common response to 
these threats while relinquishing some of their traditional sovereign 
prerogatives at national borders already poses a challenge to the capacity of the 
member-states to co-operate and to trust each other. Co-operation in the fields 
of crime prevention, policing, judicial affairs, and the administration of 




























































































EU integration for the existing member-states. Yet despite the evident 
reluctance of some of them, the EU is tending to become a "security 
community." It is this relatively recent and rapidly evolving dimension of EU 
integration that is likely to prove a particularly complex challenge as the EU 
enlarges into Central and Eastern Europe.
This report first assesses the state of play within the EU at present in the 
field of border management and police co-operation, before going on to 
consider the problems and prospects for an enlarged Union.
Border Management and Police Co-operation in the EU to Date
The evolution of a common regime for the management and control of the EU’s 
external frontier has been driven by two rather different imperatives: firstly, by 
the logic of completing the Single Market; and secondly, by mounting alarm at 
the perceived prospect of uncontrolled waves of economic migrants, asylum- 
seekers and transnational criminal activity in the wake of the collapse of 
communism in the east and the Balkans. There has been a seemingly inexorable 
tendency for the deepening of EU integration, and the enjoyment by its citizens 
of the associated economic benefits and political freedoms, to be pursued at the 
cost of creating a "Fortress Europe", confronting the EU’s neighbours and 
would-be future members with ever-higher and more rigid barriers.
The latest phase in this process is the incorporation of the Schengen 
acquis into the EU framework after the Treaty of Amsterdam. This acquis 
consists in the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Convention, together 
with ail the decisions and rules which have been adopted by the Executive 
Committee of Schengen. The objective is to create an area of free movement by 
removing controls at the common borders of the participating states, with 
compensatory strengthening of controls at the external border, accompanied by 
an array of "flanking” measures designed to enhance security within the 
Schengen area. The most significant flanking measures are:
- strict control of the external frontier according to common rules contained in a 
Schengen Manual for the External Frontier;
- the exchange of information on prohibited immigrants, wanted persons, stolen 
vehicles etc.;
- enhanced police co-operation between the participating states;




























































































- movement towards a common visa, asylum and immigration policy.
One major problem in incorporating Schengen into the Treaty has been genuine 
difficulty in discovering the content of the Schengen acquis, largely because the 
Schengen Executive Committee’s decisions and rules have not been formally 
published. This was finally in done April 1999 in order for them to be 
incorporated into the Treaty, which came into effect on 1 May 1999. An 
additional problem has been the allocation of the various parts of Schengen 
across the First (immigration and asylum) and Third (police and judicial co­
operation) Pillars of the Treaty. The considerable legal complexity of the system 
is further exacerbated by the British, Irish and Danish opt-outs. Indeed, the legal 
complexity of the system and intricate debates about competences and the 
implications for the institutional balance within the EU have tended to 
overshadow all else, to the point where the very purpose of co-operation tends 
to get lost.
There has been a tendency to conflate two quite different objectives: the 
fight against crime on the one hand, and policies on immigration and asylum on 
the other. The debate surrounding the incorporation of Schengen into the Treaty 
was heavily coloured by the increasing salience in many member-states’ 
domestic politics of the issues of rising numbers of illegal immigrants and also 
of asylum-seekers. In the process, issues of immigration became confused with 
those of security and crime, and concern to prevent illegal immigration was 
allowed to override fair consideration of the genuine claims of asylum-seekers. 
The Amsterdam Treaty explicitly stated that these two policy areas should be 
separated, but it is in the implementation of EU policy in practice that the 
greatest difficulties are likely to continue to arise.
Overall, the emphasis has been unduly placed on repressive measures at 
the expense of humanitarian, liberal values and adherence to international 
commitments and standards in the field of asylum. Moreover, the high priority 
given to concerns about crime and immigration has tended to crowd out 
consideration of the crucial role the border regime plays in external relations 
and its implications for the development of a common foreign and security 
policy (the Second Pillar). While the Amsterdam Treaty made welcome 
progress in transferring competences in the field of visas, immigration and 
asylum to the First Pillar, the emergent common border policy still suffers from 
the legally convoluted and obscure acquis, institutional fragmentation and poor 
co-ordination between all three Pillars, and an underlying conceptual 
incoherence. Underlying these shortcomings can be detected lingering concerns 
about the implications of a common border policy for national sovereignty.
A somewhat less problematic achievement of the Treaty has been the 




























































































(including the UK, albeit with an important opt-out concerning the role of the 
European Court of Justice). It is, however, still in an early stage of development 
and goes little further than being a European equivalent of Interpol. In essence 
it is an office for exchange of information, analysis of criminal intelligence and 
for making suggestions about lines of enquiry to national authorities. At present 
it seems unlikely to develop into a centrally important instrument in assisting 
enquiries into complex criminal activities. It has modest resources in terms of 
professional personnel which are not on the scale of criminal investigation 
departments of medium-sized European cities. The list of crimes in which 
Europol may be involved, ranging from financial crime to terrorism, drug­
trafficking, pedophilia and arms trafficking, is extremely ambitious and it is 
difficult to envisage how Europo) can make more than a marginal impact on 
efforts to repress them. The holding of data on individuals and historic data is 
severely circumscribed for data protection reasons. Europol officials lack police 
powers and have not yet been invited by national authorities to participate in an 
advisory capacity in investigations. Finally, although analysis of criminal 
intelligence is envisaged as a major role, there are serious practical difficulties 
in transnational sharing of sensitive intelligence.
Effective co-operation between national police forces to date has been 
characterised mainly by bilateralism and competition between diverse national 
traditions and systems of policing. There is no unified, concerted common EU 
approach to policing, and sociological research has found an evident scepticism 
and lack of commitment among the national police forces of the member-states 
to the formal commitments of their governments to developing EU police co­
operation, including Europol.
Co-operation in border control and in particular in criminal policing 
presupposes a high degree of mutual trust, respect for and tolerance of different 
police and administrative cultures, as well as accurate understanding of partners’ 
systems, capacities and particular circumstances. Co-operation in this field to 
date has exposed the low levels of trust and influence of negative cultural 
stereotypes among the partners: typically, northern partners have expressed 
concern about the professional competence and integrity of frontier police in 
southern Europe, and fears about the spread of mafia-type criminal 
organisations into northern Europe. The press and TV of the member-states are 
quick to pick up and dramatise these issues to an anxious public opinion.
Schengen has only now been brought into the treaty framework and is 
thus very young as an EU policy area. The fact that it existed as an inter­
governmental framework of co-operation accounts for its imperfections in terms 
of institutional checks and balances (the roles of the Court of Justice, the 




























































































established areas of integration. Vigorous criticism has been voiced in the 
European and national parliaments about the lack of parliamentary involvement 
and democratic accountability over the system.
Problems and Prospects for the Enlarged EU
The difficulties posed for the candidate countries by the pattern of EU 
cooperation in border control, policing and judicial affairs are of various kinds. 
The existence of various systems of law enforcement cooperation - Interpol, 
Europol, other multilateral systems and bilateral arrangements - and the absence 
of the UK and Ireland from Schengen (although a partial change of policy has 
been announced) risk the development of an incoherent and complicated system 
of police co-operation. The obscurity and complexity of the Schengen acquis 
itself is a source of confusion, as are the constant and rapid changes taking 
place without consultation with the CEE accession states. Without having a 
chance as yet to influence the evolution of the acquis, the CEE states find 
themselves confronted by ever-higher demands on the part of the EU. Unlike 
most of the political, legal and economic reforms necessary to prepare for EU 
membership, which can be represented as having beneficial effects for the 
citizens of the candidate countries, Schengen risks being regarded as an 
imposed system, set up to defend the interests of existing member-states and 
which does not take into account the specific needs and interests of the new 
members. No opt-outs of the sort negotiated by existing members will be 
permitted for the new entrants, while at the same time there has been debate in 
some existing member-states about restricting the free movement of persons 
from CEE even after they become member-states.
The "fortress" mentality prevailing among existing member-states, the 
preoccupation with erecting an impermeable "hard" border to the east, betrays a 
self-interested short-termism. The predominant focus of member-state 
governments on repressive controls at the physical border may respond to the 
anxieties and expectations of voters, but can divert attention from the broader 
requirements of genuinely effective border management. This calls for greater 
emphasis on the development of bilateral and multilateral co-operation reaching 
well back beyond the borders. What is required is active and supportive 
engagement with neighbours, because their co-operation is crucially important 
to the effectiveness of any measure to stop illegal immigration or smuggling.
Even before accession, the candidate countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe are being required to take on primary responsibility - and the associated 
heavy costs - of managing the EU’s eastern external border. This raises 




























































































in "hardening" this border, the Central and East Europeans in many respects 
have an interest in maintaining its present rather "soft" character. For example, 
the adoption by Hungary of the EU’s common visa policy implies the 
application of a visa regime for visitors from Romania, Ukraine and 
Yugoslavia, all countries with sizeable Hungarian minorities, for whom the 
Hungarian government is committed to preserve the freest possible access to the 
"mother country". Poland’s implementation of a more restrictive regime on its 
eastern border in line with EU demands has caused appreciable damage to the 
dynamically developing cross-border trade and economic links between Poland 
and Ukraine, as well as to the evolving new pattern of mutual trust and co­
operation in relations between the two states. "Firming up" the border between 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia seems a senseless aggravation to the peoples 
of those two countries and is likely to deepen their mistrust and resentment of 
the EU.
In the process of attempting to impose this border regime on the CEE 
partners, the contradictory aspects of the member-states’ motives are exposed in 
a damaging way from the point of view of the EU's future relations with Central 
and Eastern Europe. The above-mentioned problems associated with 
transferring the Schengen acquis to CEE highlight the lack of co-ordination 
between the EU's internal security objectives and its broader external policy 
interests - and the tendency of the former to dominate. Moreover, the sense that 
the central purpose of the EU's emergent border regime is to restrict 
immigration to an absolute minimum, and that migrants are seen as a criminal 
threat to the EU, combine to produce an unappealing impression on those who 
find themselves on the receiving end of EU border control policies. Public 
opinion in the candidate countries is sensitive to any suggestion that the EU 
member-states do not treat the CEE candidates as equals and partners, but rather 
as problematic sources of criminality, unwanted migrants and asylum-seekers, 
environmental pollution. The member-states need to dispel any impression that 
they are most interested in the CEE candidates in their role as a buffer-zone in 
which these unwanted problems can be "dumped”, and as convenient 
scapegoats on which western politicians can heap the blame for rising levels of 
crime, unemployment and general malaise in their societies.
There is a reluctance on the part of member-states to consider sharing the 
enormous financial burden of policing and administering the external border. 
Both Italy and Greece have already unsuccessfully complained at the 
disproportionate costs placed on them by the Schengen regime, which explicitly 
places full responsibility on each participant state for its own part of the border. 
The new eastern external border is both physically complex and demanding to 
police, and politically very sensitive for the whole EU, and yet it is to be left 




























































































number of projects financed by Phare that cover certain aspects of this problem, 
but the sums involved are very small in relation to the full costs of policing the 
borders. The provision of high-tech equipment to CEE states to improve 
efficiency in border control and in policing more generally has. on occasion, 
been driven by the commercial interests of the security industries of the 
member-states. In practice the effect may be to enhance the technical-repressive 
capacities of new democratic states at the expense of human rights norms which 
are still only weakly embedded in their administrative structures and cultures - 
and which, of course, the EU professes as fundamental values.
When it comes to police co-operation with the CEE candidate countries, 
the endemic problems of lack of trust and reciprocity, the readiness to invoke 
negative cultural stereotypes, and the absence of a common EU model of 
policing are all too apparent. Perhaps lack of trust is only to be expected at the 
start given the near-total lack of previous direct personal links between the 
police officers of the former communist states and their counterparts in the 
west. Negative stereotypes, however, further impede the development of trust. 
A new generation of police officers, untainted by the political attitudes and 
habits of the communist past, is now rising. A high degree of professionalism in 
the criminal police forces of Central and Eastern Europe is fairly long- 
established. Problems of corruption and penetration by "mafias" and organised 
crime certainly exist, but perceptions of the extent and depth of these problems 
seem to be exaggerated, and generalisations across the board about the situation 
in CEE must at all costs be avoided.
The result is to inhibit the development of operational co-operation 
between police forces of the EU members-states and their CEE counterparts. 
The lack of reciprocity in the sharing of information is noticed and resented by 
the latter as symptomatic of an inherently unequal relationship. Institutionalised 
forms of police co-operation always tend to depend in practice on the 
emergence of accompanying informal arrangements and channels of 
communication in order to function with any degree of efficiency. These 
informal networks are likely to be led by people from countries with strong 
police traditions and a long practice in international networking.
It will be hard to counter the tendency to a "two-tier" pattern of co­
operation in an enlarged Union, and yet it may have a major negative bearing on 
the effectiveness of common action against transnational crime. However, the 
question of mutual trust and reciprocity is far more salient in the context of 
criminal police co-operation than in security and border policing operations. 
Criminal policing is probably not the priority area for co-operation in 
connection with EU enlargement to the east, and is likely to continue to develop 




























































































joint action in the field of border control and immigration. Here, it is easier to 
prescribe common standards and a common code of operation at the border. 
Examples of extensive bilateral co-operation - such as joint border patrols - are 
already in operation between EU member-states and CEE candidates. It is also 
possible to envisage innovations under the flexibility provisions of the 
Amsterdam Treaty such as the development of a joint immigration service with 
a multinational staff. The priority area for police co-operation as concerns an 
enlarging EU is precisely in borders and immigration control.
Police co-operation is further encumbered by the diversity of models of 
policing across Europe, which makes it difficult at the EU level to prescribe a 
single model for training the CEE police forces. There is much evidence of 
competition between, for example, French, German and British efforts to export 
their own model to the candidate countries, often backed by the interests of 
national security industries in exporting their technology. Training schemes are 
the key way in which officers get to know each other personally and build 
mutual trust. So far, the United States’ FBI, with its Police Academy training 
programmes, is making far more impact than the EU. A co-ordinated 
programme of police training offered jointly by the member-states’ forces, with 
each force taking on responsibility for delivery of a specific module, could be 
the first step to providing a more coherent EU presence and influence.
Conclusions
The EU's external border cannot be treated simply as a physical line on the 
ground to be defended solely by the apparatus of repression. The attempt to 
make it impermeable is doomed to ineffectiveness and can increase instability 
by disrupting economic and cultural ties between neighbours. The external 
border has an enormous impact on the states on the other side, and this 
consideration should be at the centre of the Union’s own foreign policy 
objectives. These must not be displaced by preoccupation with the internal 
ramifications of enlargement. A concerted and coherent approach, reaching 
across the Union's three pillars, is necessary to deal with many of the problems 
related to border management that are at present dealt with as if it were possible 
to stop them at the border.
The EU must search for active engagement in the problems of the world 
beyond its own borders, whether or not and to whatever extent it enlarges. 
Border management - a broader, more encompassing concept than narrowly 
defined control at the physical border - implies deepening co-operation with the 
candidate countries and the new eastern neighbours in a wide range of fields: 




























































































cross-border links between local and regional authorities and communities. The 
internal weaknesses of the pillar structure and the complexity of the institutions 
will need to be addressed if proper relationships are to be built with third 
countries bordering the enlarged Union, and with the new entrants joining the 
Union.
The EU’s own internal diversity - including the diverse, and more or less 
satisfactory ways the member-states implement the acquis - is a source of 
confusion and mixed messages for the candidates, diminishing the effectiveness 
of the EU’s assistance to their preparations for membership. The danger is that 
this will induce cynicism on the part of the accession countries, who will be 
tempted to approximate their legislation on paper, but exert less effort in 
practice. The present institutional structure within the JHA area makes 
inadequate provisions for political accountability and the right of appeal 
(judicial recourse) for European citizens, which is a matter of concern for the 
established democracies of the west as much as for the new democracies 
seeking to enter the EU. The JHA acquis is evolving rapidly, with little 
consideration for its impact on CEE candidates, who are being asked to 
implement it with much less flexibility than the member-states have hitherto 
permitted themselves. An unsustainable contradiction is emerging between the 
EU member-states’ urging the CEE candidates to be ready to take over 
responsibility for the Union’s external frontier in the east as soon as they 
become members, while at the same time (at least at present) wanting to oblige 
the new CEE members to accept long transition periods in the area of free 
movement of people.
In preparing the candidates for membership, the Commission is 
developing new capacities in new areas - namely, in JHA - leading to 
involvement in the CEE’s domestic institution-building far beyond what 
existing member-states have hitherto found necessary or acceptable. These 
measures have been justified by pointing to the exceptional needs of the CEE 
candidates, and often the pressure for such involvement comes from the 
demands of the candidates themselves. These new demands may in turn induce 
a new readiness on the part of existing member-states to deepen co-operation, 
for the benefit of the accession candidates but also in their own interests. So, for 
example, the member-states’ impact on police methods and culture in the new 
democracies could be much enhanced by co-operation among themselves to 
develop a joint training programme - a "virtual academy" combining the 
strengths of the EU police forces to match that of the FBI’s Police Academy.
Another such area for developing new forms of co-operation is in burden- 
sharing in the management of the external border. This is already a matter of 




























































































obvious difficulties in meeting the demands placed on them by this 
responsibility. New forms of co-operation at the external border (such as joint 
or multi-national border patrols and immigration services), and improved 
comparative statistical data on immigration and crime, need to be developed by 
the member-states to confront the tasks which none of them can hope to handle 
effectively alone. Past experience suggests that such challenges are best met by 
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